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RECENT DECISIONS
PrimaFacie Tort: Is Actual Malice Necessary?

Plaintiff in Marcus v. Textron,' a tort action, alleged that defendant breached
its contract with plaintiff solely to injure plaintiff. The court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to allege special damage, and indicated that the
''2
prima facie tort action "is not a substitute for traditional tort or contract actions,
3
that malevolent purpose is a necessary ingredient of the prima facie tort action,
and that "[m]ixed motives of commercial gain and personal antagonism are not
sufficient" to establish a cause of action "even though the commercial gain is
' 4
sought by means that are questionable morally or ethically.

The prima fade tort doctrine arose out of dissatisfaction with the "pigeonhole" classification of intentional torts. 5 Justice Holmes defined the action in
what is now a classic statement:

".... prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damages is a
cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be
the form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to
escape." 6
While the prima facie tort doctrine is of recent development,7 the existing prima
fade tort decisions cast doubt on the general validity of the conclusions set forth
in the Marcus case.8 That these conclusions are doubtful will be demonstrated by
1. 177 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup.Ct. 1958).
2. Id. at 965.
3. Id. at 966: "It is difficult to plead a prima facie tort except by the conclusionary statement that the act or acts were motivated by malice . . .!
4. The court cites Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng. Corp., 2 App.
Div.2d 27, 1952 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1956), wherein defendant's desire for commercial
gain was held to justify his act. There the court said:
"Defendant's self-interest negatives malice, even though the
means employed might be of questionable morality and ethical validity. Competition as such, no matter how vigorous or
even ruthless, is not a tort of common law." (152 N.Y.S.2d
955, 958).
Compare the foregoing statement with the disposition in the Schisgall case.
infra note 13, and the Langan case, infra note 18. See also infra note 19.
5. Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 Buffalo L. Rev. 1
(1957).
6. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904). Note that the intent required is the specific interft to harm. Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146
N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st. Dep't 1955).
7. Pound, Modern Trends in Tort Law, 16 NACA L.J. 21, 28 (1955). The
New York Court of Appeals formally adopted the prima facie tort doctrine in
Advance Music Corporation v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d
401 (1946).
8. The writer believes that the diposition of the case is sound, but challenges the conclusions set forth in the decision as faulty.
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exploring the relation of "disinterested malevolence," that is, malevolent purpose,9
to the required justification.
Representative' 0 cases suggest, with respect to disinterested malevolence,
the emergence of three different results, which, as will be shown, are dictated by
competing public and private interests:
(1) the act is not actionable though the actor is motivated
solely by malevolence;
(2)
the act is actionable only if the actor is motivated solely by
malevolence;
(3) the act is actionable though the actor is not motivated by
malevolence.
I. An act motivated solely by malevolence does not necessarily give rise to
a cause of action. For example, conspiring solely for malevolent reasons to have
plaintiff removed fior his union position by preferring against him charges
which are true was held justified in Walsh v. Judge." And in Brandt v. Winchell,12 where plaintiff alleged that defendant, solely for malevolent reasons, urged
law enforcement officers to bring criminal proceedings against plaintiff, the act
was also held justified. The public interest in the exposure by private persons of
others reasonably suspected of criminal activity was held to outweigh the harm
to plaintiff to such an extent as to garb defendant with civil immunity in both
cases.
II. There are two kinds of situations in which an act becomes actionable
only if committed out of disinterested malevolence:
(1) a traditional tort action lies, but the defendant acts only for
malevolent reasons;
(2) the facts do not fit a traditional tort action and the act is
generally not considered morally evil in the absence of a solely malevolent purpose.
An example of a case arising in the first situation is Schisgall,v. Fairchild
9. Malevolent purpose is more than the specific intent to harm. It Is the
reason or motive for the act. For example, one may intend to kill another person, but may not have any malevolent purpose, such as revenge, as in the commonly cited mercy killing situation.
10. For a more adequate list of prima facie tort cases see: Forkosch, An

Analysis of the "PrimaFacie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 Cornell L.Q. 465 (1957);

Halpern, supra note 8; Comment, 22 Fordham L. Rev. 185 (1953); Note, 32 St.
John's L. Rev. 282 (1958).
11. 258 N.Y. 76, 179 N.E. 264 (1932).
12. 3 N.Y.2d 628, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1958), noted in 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 181
(1958).
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Publications,13 where defendant solely out of malevolence breached its contract
to publish plaintiff's book after it was written. Defendant's act was held unjustified,
and plaintiff's prima facie tort action allowed. In view of the Schisgall case the
statement that "the prima facie tort action is not a substitute for traditional tort
or contract actions," although literally true, appears too broad because it obscures
the fact that where a traditional action lies, a prima facie tort action may also lie
if the actor is motivated solely by malevolence.
An example of a case arising in the second situation, where the act is not
generally considered morally "bad" in the absence of the actor's actual malicious
purpose, is Ledwith v. International Paper Co.14 There plaintiff incurred the
enmity of defendant corporation's officers by discovering that they were doing
certain unlawful acts. Consequently, defendant demoted and then discharged
plaintiff. The court held defendant's conduct was unjustified because it was motivated solely by actual malice.
III. Actual malice never has been required in intentional tort actions. Nor
is it surprising that the prima facie tort action does not always require actual
malice, especially since actual malice is not in terms required by formulation of
the prima facie tort doctrine. For example, in Advance Music Corporation v.
American Tobacco Co.,15 where plaintiff alleged that defendant sponsor of "Your
Hit Parade" intentionally harmed plaintiff without justification by excluding
from or misplacing on the "hit list" songs published by plaintiff, the court held
that the complaint, which did not allege actual malice, stated a cause of action.
In an action for inducement to terminate an at-will contract, 16 where defendant
was motivated by self-interest, the court held that the confidential relationship
between plaintiff and defendant precluded defendant from exercising what otherwise would be a privilege to induce plaintiff's employees to quit plaintiff and
work for defendant. And where there was no showing that defendant entertained
any malevolent purpose, defendant union's demand that plaintiff discharge its
barmaids and hire male bartenders before plaintiffs employees could join defendants union was held arbitrary and therefore unjustified.' 7 A defendant bank was
held accountable when it foreclosed a property mortgage to force plaintiff corporation into bankruptcy and enable defendant to purchase plaintiff's property at
a fraction of its market value, since creditors, although the defendant was moti8
vated by the desire for commercial gain.'
13. 207 Misc. 224, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
14. 64 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup.Ct. 1946), aff'd 271 App. Div. 8644, 66 N.Y.S.2d
626 (1st Dep't 1946).

15. Supra note 7.

16. A. S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957),
noted in 7 Buffalo L. Rev. 178.
17. Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 NY.S.2d 461 (Sup.Ct. 1950).
18. Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 293 N.Y. 604, 59 N.E.2d 424 (1944).
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In conclusion, the cases indicate that an act solely malicious may not be
wrongful if it incidentally advances a desirable public interest, but an act which
does not appreciably do so may be wrongful if it is solely malicious. Where the
social or legal consequences of the act are undesirable a malicious motive is not
required, because merely the intent to harm may be sufficient to make the act
wrongful. As the foregoing cases also indicate, an analysis of the prima facie tort
theory should not proceed by a mechanical ordering of motives, because in a
given fact situation the existence of a particular motive may be of little or no
consequence.19 Rather, it is important nrst to articulate the social or legal interests involved, and then determine the necessity for and the importan:e of a given
motive with respect to those interests.
Henrik H. Hansen
19. Defendant's desire for commercial gain is often a justifying motive.

Terry v. Dairymen's League, 2 App. Div.2d 494, 157 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3rd Dep't 1956).

Obviously, a milicious motive will never justify defendant's act. Consider the

validity of the following statement in analyzing the prima facie tort doctrine:

"Mixed motives of commercial gain and personal antagonism
are not sufficient to establish a cause of action."

